Security & identity

State of Email Security for Small Businesses 2026: 6,129 Domains Checked

An original EpiFive study of SPF, DMARC, MTA-STS, BIMI and DNSSEC on 6,129 small-business domains in 11 countries, with the full aggregate data as a CSV.

By EpiFive Editorial TeamReviewed/updated 17 min readHow we check our guides
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Most small businesses still leave their email domain open to spoofing. We checked the public DNS records of 6,129 small-business domains in 11 countries on 20 November 2026: 84.3% of the domains that receive email publish SPF, but only 55.2% publish DMARC and just 20.1% enforce it, so roughly four in five can be impersonated by a forged sender with little resistance from the receiving mail server.

This page is an original EpiFive data study. It explains how the sample was built, exactly what was measured, the results by country, business type and email provider, and what a small business should change first. The aggregate data is free to download and cite.

Key findings

  1. Only 20.1% enforce DMARC. Of 4,830 domains with a mail server (MX record), 969 had a DMARC policy of p=quarantine (555, 11.5%) or p=reject (414, 8.6%).
  2. 44.8% have no DMARC record at all (2,162 of 4,830), and another 34.5% (1,667) publish p=none, which monitors but does not protect. Of all DMARC records found, 62.5% were p=none.
  3. 80.8% lack the basic anti-spoofing pair. Only 925 domains (19.2%) combined a single SPF record ending in ~all or -all with an enforced DMARC policy.
  4. 12.3% publish neither SPF nor DMARC (592 domains). Receivers have nothing to check forged mail against.
  5. 15.7% have no SPF record (759 domains), and 82 domains (1.7%) publish two or more SPF records, which RFC 7208 says produces a permanent error, so their SPF is broken.
  6. Microsoft 365 domains are better configured than Google Workspace domains. SPF was present on 98.1% of Microsoft 365 domains against 73.0% of Google Workspace domains; enforced DMARC was 31.2% against 13.4%.
  7. Modern transport and brand standards are rare. MTA-STS appeared on 0.8% of mail-receiving domains, TLS-RPT on 0.9% and BIMI on 1.5%.
  8. DNSSEC is signed and validating on 3.9% of domains (226 of 5,742 that resolved).
  9. Restaurants and cafes are the most exposed group. Food and drink businesses enforced DMARC on 13.1% of mail-receiving domains and 17.7% had neither SPF nor DMARC.
  10. 5.5% of the websites listed on the map no longer exist in DNS (337 of 6,129 returned NXDOMAIN).

Who this study is for

The study is written for small-business owners, office managers and the IT providers who look after them, and for journalists, newsletter writers and researchers who need current, sourced numbers on small-business email security. If you run a business domain, the tables below show where you stand against thousands of comparable businesses, and the final sections list the changes that matter most. If you write about email fraud, business email compromise or deliverability, every figure on this page can be traced to the downloadable CSV.

Methodology

Sample

The businesses come from OpenStreetMap, the open map database edited by volunteers. EpiFive keeps cached lists of OpenStreetMap businesses for the business districts of a set of cities; the lists used here were fetched between 15 and 17 November 2026. Each listing has a name, a map category and, where the map has one, a website.

  • 12,792 listings had a website, giving 12,561 unique domains.
  • Removed: 231 repeat listings of the same domain, 28 domains listed three or more times (treated as chains or franchises, not small businesses), 352 hosts that are not a registrable domain (for example a page on a website builder's subdomain, where the business does not control the DNS), and 143 domains from cached city files that are no longer in the current city list. Domains on EpiFive's internal exclusion list were also removed.
  • That left 12,038 eligible domains in 37 cities. To keep the run short and stop the largest cities dominating, up to 300 domains per city were picked at random with a fixed seed. The final sample is 6,129 domains: United States 2,953, India 803, Australia 600, Canada 600, UAE 408, Singapore 300, Saudi Arabia 226, Oman 74, Kuwait 71, Qatar 67 and Bahrain 27.

The city lists do not include healthcare providers, so clinics and pharmacies are not part of the sample. Business types were grouped from the map category: retail (shops), food and drink (restaurants, cafes, bars), hotels, travel and tourism, trades and crafts, professional services (legal, accounting, finance, insurance, real estate, architecture, engineering, consulting), companies, agencies and other offices, and other services.

What was measured

All checks were made on 20 November 2026 between 05:44 and 06:06 UTC. Each domain received public DNS queries over HTTPS to Cloudflare's resolver at 1.1.1.1 (JSON API, eight domains at a time, an 8-second timeout and one retry) and a single HTTPS HEAD request to the home page. No web page was read and no email address was collected.

CheckDNS name and typeCounted as present when
Mail serverMX at the domainat least one MX host (a null MX "." counts as none)
Email providerMX host namesmatched to Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, Zoho Mail or other
SPFTXT at the domaina record starting v=spf1; the final all qualifier was recorded
DMARCTXT at _dmarca record starting v=DMARC1; p= and rua= were recorded
MTA-STSTXT at _mta-stsa record starting v=STSv1
TLS-RPTTXT at _smtp._tlsa record starting v=TLSRPTv1
BIMITXT at default._bimia record starting v=BIMI1
DNSSECDS at the domain, AD flag on the MX answerDS published and the answer validated by 1.1.1.1
HTTPSHEAD https://domain/any HTTP response over a valid certificate within 6 seconds

Email measures use the 4,830 domains with an MX record as the denominator, because a domain that does not receive mail has different needs (covered in its own section). DNSSEC and HTTPS use the 5,742 domains that resolved. The 387 domains that did not resolve were 337 NXDOMAIN, 49 SERVFAIL and one lookup that failed twice.

Limitations

  • The sample is not representative of all small businesses. OpenStreetMap coverage depends on volunteer mapping, favors city centers and businesses with a street presence, and only includes businesses whose listing has a website. The results describe this sample, not a country's whole economy.
  • DNS state on one day. Records change; a domain fixed the day after the check is still counted as it was on 20 November 2026.
  • DKIM was not measured. DKIM keys sit under selector names that each provider or admin chooses, and public DNS cannot list them, so a missing key cannot be proven from outside.
  • MTA-STS and BIMI were checked by their TXT records only. A working MTA-STS setup also needs a policy file on mta-sts.<domain>, and BIMI logos only show where the mailbox provider's own criteria (often including a certificate) are met.
  • DNSSEC precision. All 226 domains with a DS record also returned validated answers. A domain with broken DNSSEC usually fails at a validating resolver with SERVFAIL, but SERVFAIL has other causes too, so the 49 SERVFAIL domains are counted as not resolving rather than as DNSSEC failures.
  • Provider detection uses MX hosts. A Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace domain whose mail passes through a filtering gateway first is counted under "other".
  • HTTPS was tested on the bare domain only. A site that answers only on www. or presents a certificate for a different name counts as not answering, so the HTTPS figure is a lower bound.

SPF results

SPF tells receiving servers which servers may send mail for your domain. Among the 4,830 mail-receiving domains:

SPF stateDomainsShare
SPF record present4,07184.3%
No SPF record75915.7%
Two or more SPF records (broken)821.7%
Ends in -all (fail)1,44229.9%
Ends in ~all (softfail)2,37549.2%
Ends in ?all (neutral)1222.5%
Ends in +all (allows any sender)10.02%
Uses redirect= or has no all491.0%

The +all mistake that security guides warn about turned out to be very rare: one domain in 4,830. The more common failure is having no record or two records. RFC 7208 is explicit that more than one SPF record produces a "permerror" result, which means the 82 domains with duplicate records gain nothing from SPF even though they published it. This usually happens when a business adds a new email or marketing service and creates a second v=spf1 record instead of merging the new include into the existing one. The post on the SPF 10-lookup limit shows how to merge records safely.

DMARC results

DMARC tells receivers what to do when a message claiming to be from your domain fails SPF and DKIM alignment, and where to send reports.

DMARC stateDomainsShare of 4,830
No DMARC record2,16244.8%
p=none (monitor only)1,66734.5%
p=quarantine55511.5%
p=reject4148.6%
Two or more DMARC records (ignored by receivers)300.6%
Aggregate reports requested (rua=)1,39128.8%

The pattern is clear: many businesses have started DMARC and stopped at p=none. Under RFC 7489, p=none asks receivers to take no specific action, so it is a reporting stage, not protection. Of the 969 enforced policies, 34 used a pct= value below 100, which applies the policy to only part of the failing mail. Only 28.8% of mail-receiving domains ask for aggregate reports, which means most domains on p=none are not even collecting the data they would need to move to enforcement.

Part of the reason so many records exist at all is the bulk-sender rules at the large mailbox providers. Google requires a DMARC record (p=none is accepted) for senders of more than 5,000 messages a day to personal Gmail accounts, and Microsoft set a similar requirement for Outlook.com, Hotmail and Live addresses from 5 May 2025. Neither rule requires enforcement, and most small businesses send far below those volumes, so the rules have not pushed them past p=none.

Results by email provider

The provider was identified from MX host names. Shares below are of the 4,830 mail-receiving domains: Google Workspace 1,803 (37.3%), Microsoft 365 1,266 (26.2%), Zoho Mail 75 (1.6%) and all other providers 1,686 (34.9%), a group that includes 149 domains behind a filtering gateway, 111 on GoDaddy email and 13 on Titan email.

ProviderDomainsSPF presentDMARC presentDMARC enforcedNeither SPF nor DMARC
Microsoft 3651,26698.1%63.3%31.2%1.3%
Google Workspace1,80373.0%53.3%13.4%19.3%
Zoho Mail7592.0%40.0%17.3%6.7%
Other providers1,68685.6%52.0%18.9%13.2%

Microsoft 365 domains stand out on SPF: only 1.3% had neither SPF nor DMARC. Google Workspace domains often receive mail through Google's MX hosts with no SPF record at all: 19.3% of them had neither SPF nor DMARC. SPF style also differs: 78.8% of Microsoft 365 domains end their SPF in -all, while 62.6% of Google Workspace domains use ~all and only 4.9% use -all. If your domain is on Google Workspace, also confirm DKIM signing using the Google Workspace DKIM setup guide.

Results by country

Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain each had fewer than 100 mail-receiving domains, so they appear only in the combined Gulf row, which also includes Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The CSV has every country separately.

Country or regionMail-receiving domainsSPF presentDMARC presentDMARC enforcedNeither
United States2,34780.6%50.2%17.0%15.1%
India61789.5%57.5%27.4%8.8%
Australia50286.5%65.1%22.3%9.8%
Canada47984.3%59.1%14.0%11.9%
UAE31494.3%64.6%27.1%5.1%
Singapore22781.9%59.9%19.4%12.8%
Saudi Arabia16689.2%60.8%33.1%8.4%
Gulf (six countries combined)65891.8%59.1%26.9%7.3%

The United States sample, the largest, had the highest share of domains with neither record (15.1%) and DMARC on only half of mail-receiving domains. Canada had the lowest enforcement rate (14.0%). Saudi Arabia, India and the UAE had the highest enforcement rates, but their samples are smaller and, like every row here, reflect the businesses that appear on the map with a website.

Results by business type

Business typeMail-receiving domainsSPF presentDMARC presentDMARC enforcedNeither
Food and drink1,81077.7%45.2%13.1%17.7%
Retail1,60285.1%58.2%18.2%11.0%
Companies, agencies and other offices65593.9%70.1%37.7%4.6%
Professional services33491.6%60.5%28.4%6.9%
Hotels, travel and tourism20392.1%61.1%26.1%6.9%
Trades and crafts18186.7%60.2%21.0%10.5%
Other services4577.8%48.9%15.6%20.0%

Offices (companies, IT firms, agencies) were the best configured, which fits businesses that are more likely to have an IT provider. Professional services such as law, accounting and real estate firms enforced DMARC on 28.4% of domains, which still leaves more than seven in ten without protection in a sector that routinely sends invoices and payment details by email. Restaurants and cafes were the least protected group.

MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI and DNSSEC

These standards go beyond spoofing protection:

StandardWhat it doesDomainsShare
MTA-STSTells senders to require TLS to your MX hosts380.8% of 4,830
TLS-RPTAsks senders to report TLS delivery failures450.9% of 4,830
BIMIPublishes a brand logo for supporting inboxes741.5% of 4,830
DNSSECSigns DNS answers so they cannot be forged2263.9% of 5,742

BIMI requires DMARC at enforcement: the BIMI Group implementation guide states that p=none and pct values below 100 are not accepted, so a BIMI record on a domain without enforcement will not display a logo. MTA-STS needs both the _mta-sts TXT record and a policy file served over HTTPS, as RFC 8461 describes. DNSSEC is also a prerequisite for inbound SMTP DANE; see inbound SMTP DANE with DNSSEC in Exchange Online if your mail runs on Microsoft 365.

Domains that do not send email

912 resolving domains (15.9%) had no MX record. A domain that never sends mail can still be used in a forged From address, and the usual protection is v=spf1 -all plus a DMARC p=reject record. Only 81 of these 912 domains (8.9%) published v=spf1 -all as their SPF record and only 50 (5.5%) published DMARC p=reject. A business that keeps an old or website-only domain should add both records.

Websites and HTTPS

Of the 5,742 resolving domains, 5,215 (90.8%) answered an HTTPS request on the bare domain with a valid certificate within 6 seconds. The other 527 either did not answer on the bare domain, timed out or presented a certificate that failed validation; some of them work on www. only, so treat this as a lower bound. Separately, 337 of the 6,129 domains listed on the map (5.5%) no longer exist in DNS, a reminder that map listings and business directories go out of date.

What it means for a small business

Spoofing protection is the gap with the most impact, and it is free to fix. In order:

  1. Publish one SPF record that lists every service that sends mail for you and ends in ~all or -all. If you have two records, merge them.
  2. Turn on DKIM in your email provider's admin center. Microsoft 365 users can follow SPF, DKIM and DMARC for Microsoft 365.
  3. Publish DMARC with reports: start with p=none and a rua= address so you can see who sends as your domain.
  4. Move to p=quarantine, then p=reject once the reports show your legitimate services pass. Most businesses in this study never take this step.
  5. Protect domains that do not send mail with v=spf1 -all and DMARC p=reject.
  6. Consider MTA-STS and TLS-RPT once the basics are enforced, especially if you exchange sensitive documents by email.

Check your own domain

You can see where your own domain stands in a few seconds:

Download the data

The aggregate results are free to download as a CSV: email-security-study-2026.csv. It has one row per segment (all domains, each country, the Gulf region, each business type and each email provider) with counts and percentages for every measure on this page. It contains no business names or domains. You may reuse it with credit to EpiFive and a link to this page. The business listings it was built from are copyright OpenStreetMap contributors, available under the Open Database License.

How to cite this study

Citation: EpiFive. (2026). State of Email Security for Small Businesses 2026: 6,129 Domains Checked. https://www.epifive.com/blog/small-business-email-security-study-2026

Short form for articles: "according to a 2026 EpiFive study of 6,129 small-business domains".

Embeddable summary

Copy this text, or the HTML version below it, into your article or newsletter:

Only 20.1% of small-business email domains enforce DMARC, and 44.8% have no DMARC record at all,
according to EpiFive's State of Email Security for Small Businesses 2026 study of 6,129 domains
in 11 countries (checked 20 November 2026).
Source: https://www.epifive.com/blog/small-business-email-security-study-2026
<p>Only 20.1% of small-business email domains enforce DMARC, and 44.8% have no DMARC record at all
(<a href="https://www.epifive.com/blog/small-business-email-security-study-2026">EpiFive, State of Email
Security for Small Businesses 2026</a>, 6,129 domains checked).</p>

What we checked

  • Queried Cloudflare's DNS over HTTPS JSON API (1.1.1.1) on 2026-11-20 between 05:44 and 06:06 UTC for the MX, SPF, DMARC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI and DS records of 6,129 domains, and sent one HTTPS HEAD request per domain. Every number on this page comes from those results.
  • Recalculated the headline shares from the counts: 969 / 4,830 = 20.1% enforced DMARC; 2,162 / 4,830 = 44.8% without DMARC; 925 / 4,830 = 19.2% with the basic SPF and DMARC pair; 1,667 / 2,668 = 62.5% of DMARC records at p=none.
  • Confirmed in RFC 7208 (sections 4.5 and 4.6.2) that more than one SPF record yields "permerror" and that a bare all defaults to +all; confirmed in RFC 7489 (sections 6.3 and 6.6.3) the meaning of p=none, quarantine and reject and that multiple DMARC records stop policy discovery.
  • Checked Google's email sender guidelines and Microsoft's Outlook.com high-volume sender announcement on 2026-11-20: both require a DMARC record for senders above 5,000 messages a day and accept p=none.
  • Confirmed in the BIMI Group implementation guide that BIMI needs DMARC at quarantine or reject with pct=100, and in RFC 8461 where the MTA-STS TXT record and policy file live.
  • Confirmed in Cloudflare's DNS over HTTPS documentation that the AD flag means every record in the answer was verified with DNSSEC, which is how DNSSEC validation was measured.
  • Not checked: DKIM keys (selector names cannot be discovered from public DNS), MTA-STS policy files, and whether BIMI logos actually display in any inbox.

Last tested: 2026-11-20

References

Questions people ask

What percentage of small businesses have DMARC?

In this study, 55.2% of the 4,830 small-business domains that receive email published a DMARC record on 20 November 2026. Only 20.1% had a policy that asks receivers to act on failures (p=quarantine or p=reject); 34.5% published p=none, which only monitors.

Is DMARC p=none enough to stop spoofing?

No. RFC 7489 defines p=none as a request that no specific action be taken on failing mail, so a forged message from your domain is treated as if there were no policy. It is a useful first step while you read the reports, but protection starts at p=quarantine or p=reject.

How was the study sample chosen?

The domains come from business listings with a website in OpenStreetMap for 37 cities in 11 countries. Chains, platform subdomains and duplicates were removed, and up to 300 domains per city were picked at random with a fixed seed, giving 6,129 domains.

Can I use the data in my own article?

Yes. The aggregate CSV is free to download and reuse with credit to EpiFive and a link to this page. It contains counts and percentages only; no business or domain is named in it.

DMARCSPFMTA-STSDNSSECEmail authentication