Security & identity

Windows Server 2028 Hardened Server Core: Test Legacy Apps and Relax Settings

Test legacy workloads against the Windows Server 2028 preview's hardened Server Core baseline, then relax only the categories they need with Microsoft's cmdlets.

By EpiFive Editorial TeamReviewed/updated 11 min readHow we check our guides
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Windows Server 2028 Server Core installs with hundreds of security settings already on, so legacy applications that depend on older protocols can fail on first run. The safe approach is to score the baseline, run each workload in a lab VM, and use Restore-MSHardenedPolicy on only the category the workload needs, with -WhatIf first. This is a preview feature in Insider build 29706, so treat everything here as lab guidance.

Who this is for

This guide is for server admins, small IT teams and MSPs who run line-of-business software on Windows Server 2022 or 2025 and want to know what the Windows Server 2028 preview will do to it. By the end you will have a repeatable test routine: a baseline score, a list of what each workload needs, a narrow exception for each, and a record you can reuse when the release documentation arrives.

Facts about the hardened configuration come from Microsoft's Tech Community post "Announcing Hardened Server Core for Windows Server Insiders" (dated November 17, 2026), read on 2026-11-22. For the wider preview picture see Windows Server 2028 preview: what is new, and for lab setup see Windows Server 2028 preview: download and install in a lab. For the upgrade decision, see Windows Server 2028 vs 2025.

Preview status and prerequisites

Windows Server 2028 is a public preview. Microsoft has not announced a general availability date or pricing on the pages we read, so none is given here. Microsoft also says the tool and cmdlet names may change in a later preview flight, so re-check them each time you update a build.

Before you start:

  • A Windows Server Insider Preview VM running build 29706 or later, installed as Server Core, with no production data on it.
  • A VM checkpoint taken before any change. Microsoft says Restore-MSHardenedPolicy does not restore a previous snapshot, so your own checkpoint is the only way back to an exact earlier state.
  • A copy of the legacy application, its installer and a short list of what "working" means (sign in, open a share, run a job, remote-manage it).
  • An elevated PowerShell session on the server.

What the baseline changes

Microsoft groups the hardened defaults by layer. The ones most likely to touch a legacy workload are marked below.

LayerWhat Microsoft says is onLegacy risk
Identity and authenticationKerberos preferred over NTLM, LSASS protection, strong passwords and account lockout, no consumer accountsApps that rely on NTLM or weak passwords
Network exposureSMB signing and encryption, firewall on in every profile, legacy name resolution and unauthenticated RPC disabledOld file clients, apps using NetBIOS-style names
CryptographyTLS limited to modern cipher suites, hybrid post-quantum key exchange (ML-KEM), stronger key protectionClients that only offer old cipher suites
Privilege and admin accessAdmins approve elevation, Guests cannot sign in, installers cannot self-elevateInstallers and services that expect to elevate silently
Platform and code integrityOnly Microsoft-signed code runs in the sign-in process, stricter signature validation, encrypted paging fileThird-party sign-in or credential components
Remote access and observabilityRDP with NLA and TLS, WinRM without Basic, Digest or unencrypted traffic, advanced audit, script block logging, larger event logsManagement scripts and monitoring agents

Microsoft's own warning is direct: the hardened defaults may break older protocols, legacy authentication, and some management tools and scripts, so test before deployment.

Items not hardened yet

Microsoft lists what is still to come in future previews: NTLM blocking, Secure Boot and DMA protection requirements, kernel shadow stacks, print and RPC hardening including Windows Protected Print, and extras such as the logon banner. Your test result today is therefore a floor, not a ceiling. A workload that passes on build 29706 may meet new restrictions later, especially if it uses NTLM or old print and RPC features, so repeat the routine on each new build.

How policy delivery changes your troubleshooting

Microsoft states that hardened values are delivered as policy in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies where supported, and that policy overrides local configuration. Three consequences follow.

  1. Local changes can be refused. Microsoft's documented example: running Set-Item WSMan:\localhost\Service\Auth\Basic -Value $true is refused with a message that the setting is controlled by policies, and the value remains false. If a script of yours fails this way, it is hitting the baseline, not a bug.
  2. gpresult is not the tool. Microsoft says gpresult and RSOP show these settings as Not Configured because the defaults are built into the image and no .pol file exists. Use the evaluation module instead.
  3. Whichever tool sets a value owns it. OSConfig, local or domain Group Policy, or another tool can manage these settings. The firewall stays locally manageable.

Step 1: Record the baseline score

Run these from an elevated PowerShell session. They come from the MSHardenedPolicyEval module described in Microsoft's post.

Get-MSHardenedPolicyCategories
Get-MSHardenedPolicyScore

The first lists valid -Category names, which you need for the exception step. The second scores each category and overall. Microsoft documents this example output, which shows the shape and not your values:

Name                          PassingPolicyCount PolicyCount Score
Overall                                      191         237 80.59
AuditPolicy                                   17          17   100
CredentialAndLSAProtection                     3           3   100
CryptographyAndTLS                             3           3   100
RemoteDesktop                                 11          11   100
RemoteManagement                               6           6   100
SMBAndFileSharing                             18          19 94.73
WindowsFirewall                               30          30   100

Save your own output to a file. Microsoft's known issues explain why you will not see 100%: some settings are not measured yet (including TLS cipher suites and ECC curves), some scores depend on components that are not installed by default, and on KDC servers such as domain controllers some settings may show as unmet even when applied. MSHardenedPolicyEval.exe in %SystemRoot%\System32 offers the same functions from a command prompt and can write results to a log file and the event log.

Step 2: Run the workload and note each failure

Install and exercise the application with the checklist you prepared. Write each failure down with its exact error text and the time it happened. Do not change any setting yet. Common failure patterns map to the layers in the table:

  • A file share from an old client or NAS cannot be reached. SMB signing and encryption are on. Microsoft's SMB signing page lists errors you might see when a third-party SMB server does not support signing, including 0xc000a000 and STATUS_INVALID_SIGNATURE ("The cryptographic signature is invalid."), and says to adjust the third-party server to allow signing. Its page also says that requiring signing disables guest access, and that disabling signing as a workaround is not recommended.
  • A remote-management script that uses Basic authentication over WinRM fails. WinRM Basic, Digest and unencrypted traffic are off.
  • An app that authenticates with NTLM fails or prompts. Kerberos is preferred, and NTLM blocking is listed as coming later. Microsoft's NTLM overview says Kerberos is the preferred method in Active Directory environments but a non-Microsoft or Microsoft application might still use NTLM, and that reducing NTLM requires knowing what your applications need.
  • An installer or service cannot elevate silently. Installers cannot elevate on their own, so run the setup from an approved admin session.

Read each failure against Microsoft's wording before touching anything. Often the better fix is in the application or its configuration, such as enabling SMB signing on the NAS or moving a script to an encrypted WinRM transport, not on the server.

Step 3: Relax one category at a time

When the application truly needs an exception, find the category from Get-MSHardenedPolicyCategories and preview the change:

Restore-MSHardenedPolicy -Category SMBAndFileSharing -WhatIf

SMBAndFileSharing is a category name taken from Microsoft's documented score output; confirm it against your own Get-MSHardenedPolicyCategories result. Read what -WhatIf says it would change. If it is acceptable, run the same command without -WhatIf. Microsoft notes that the cmdlet warns when a restart may be needed. Then:

  1. Take note of the category and the reason in your change record.
  2. Restart if prompted.
  3. Re-run the workload test and Get-MSHardenedPolicyScore. The score for that category should drop, and that drop is your documented exception.

Be aware of the scope. Restore-MSHardenedPolicy removes the hardened values for a category or, without -Category, for the whole server, and it returns standard Windows Server behavior rather than a prior snapshot. Always name the category. Never run it without -Category on a server you care about.

To bring protection back when the workload is retired or fixed:

Set-MSHardenedPolicy -Category SMBAndFileSharing -WhatIf
Set-MSHardenedPolicy -Category SMBAndFileSharing

Set-MSHardenedPolicy accepts multiple categories, and omitting -Category applies all of them.

Granularity limits

The documented cmdlets work at category level. A category holds several settings, so relaxing one to satisfy one application can also loosen others in that category. Microsoft's pages we read do not document a per-setting exception through these cmdlets. If you need a finer-grained exception, Microsoft says OSConfig or Group Policy can manage, extend and enforce these settings, but we did not find documented step-by-step instructions for that on the build 29706 post, so check the release documentation when it appears.

Managed servers: avoid conflicting tools

If a server is managed by OSConfig or Group Policy, Microsoft says to use MSHardenedPolicyEval (the cmdlets or the .exe) for scoring only. Applying or restoring with in-box tooling can conflict with the management tool. Once a baseline is applied with OSConfig, OSConfig reports compliance and corrects drift, so a manual Restore may be undone. Make the exception in the tool that owns the value, and use the score as your read-out.

For a fleet, this matters because Intune management for eligible Windows servers is in preview and Azure Arc can also manage servers. Pick one owner per setting and record it. If you already patch Arc-connected servers, see Azure Update Manager patching for Arc servers.

Verification

After each exception, confirm three things:

  1. The application works end to end, including after a restart.
  2. Get-MSHardenedPolicyScore shows only the category you changed with a lower score, and every other category as before.
  3. If SMB was involved, the documented check works: Get-SmbServerConfiguration | FL RequireSecuritySignature returns True when signing is required and False when it is not, per Microsoft's SMB signing page. That page is written for Windows Server 2025 and Windows 11 24H2; whether the same cmdlets behave identically under the 2028 hardened policy is not documented in the pages we read, so treat the cmdlet results as informational and rely on the score.

Troubleshooting

SymptomLikely causeWhat to do
Setting change is refused as "controlled by policies"Policy overrides local configurationUse Restore-MSHardenedPolicy for the category, or change it in the tool that owns it
gpresult shows Not ConfiguredDefaults are built in, no .pol fileUse Get-MSHardenedPolicyScore
Overall score below 100% on a clean installKnown issue on this buildCompare to your own baseline, not 100
Settings show unmet on a domain controllerKnown issue on KDC serversVerify behavior rather than score
Cmdlet not found after a build updateNames may change between previewsRe-read Microsoft's current post
STATUS_INVALID_SIGNATURE to a NASThird-party server does not support SMB signingEnable signing on the NAS, as Microsoft advises

Checklist

  • Lab VM, Server Core, build 29706 or later, checkpoint taken.
  • Baseline score saved.
  • Each workload tested with no changes first.
  • Failures recorded with exact errors.
  • One category relaxed at a time, -WhatIf first, reason recorded.
  • Score and workload re-tested after each change.
  • Owner (OSConfig, Group Policy or in-box cmdlets) recorded per setting.
  • Repeat on every new preview build.

See also

What we checked

  • Opened Microsoft's Tech Community post "Announcing Hardened Server Core for Windows Server Insiders" on 2026-11-22; confirmed build 29706, the hardening layers, the cmdlet names, -WhatIf support, and the not-yet-hardened and known-issue lists.
  • Copied the sample score table from that post as its documented output (the Overall row shows 191 of 237 policies passing, a score of 80.59). We recalculated 191 / 237 = 0.8059, which matches.
  • Compared the documented WinRM example (Set-Item on WSMan Basic refused as policy-controlled) with the post's statement that policy overrides local configuration; they agree.
  • Opened Microsoft Learn's "Control SMB signing behavior" page (updated 2025-09-15 per its metadata) on 2026-11-22 for the error text, the Get-SmbServerConfiguration check and the advice against disabling signing; it covers Windows Server 2025 and Windows 11 24H2, not 2028.
  • Opened Microsoft Learn's NTLM overview on 2026-11-22 for the statement that Kerberos is preferred and applications may still use NTLM.
  • Not tested hands-on: we did not install the preview or run any command. The category name SMBAndFileSharing is taken from the documented output, not from a live session. Steps follow Microsoft's documentation as of 2026-11-22.

Last tested: 2026-11-22

References

Questions people ask

How do I relax a hardened setting in Windows Server 2028 preview?

Run Restore-MSHardenedPolicy with the -Category parameter for the one category your workload needs, using -WhatIf first. Microsoft says this removes the hardened values and returns standard Windows Server behavior, not a prior snapshot. A restart may be required. Re-apply protection later with Set-MSHardenedPolicy.

Why does Set-Item on a WinRM setting fail on the hardened build?

Hardened values are delivered as policy under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies, and policy overrides local configuration. Microsoft's documented example shows that enabling WinRM Basic authentication with Set-Item is refused because the setting is controlled by policies, and the value stays false.

Why does gpresult show these settings as Not Configured?

Microsoft says the defaults are built into the image and no .pol file exists, so gpresult and RSOP report Not Configured. Use the MSHardenedPolicyEval cmdlets or MSHardenedPolicyEval.exe to see what is actually applied and scored.

Is hardened Server Core safe to deploy in production?

No. Windows Server 2028 is a public preview with no announced general availability date, and Microsoft says tool and cmdlet names may change in a later preview flight. Use it in a lab to find what your workloads need, and record those findings for later.

Windows Server 2028Server CoreRestore-MSHardenedPolicySMB signingWinRM